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For an indicator of monetary policy, this paper
proposes "Nonterm M3"asan alternative to M2. With
the removalofceilingson theyieldsofitsassets, theM2
aggregate has become a grouping ofdissimilar assets.
Nonterm M3 excludessmalltime depositsandthus con-
tains only monetary instruments with no set maturity
demandfor this aggregatehas been reason-
ablystable and is more sensitive to interest rates than
is the demandfor M2.
J. M. Keynes,
Interest andMoney.
Overmost of the period sincethe mid-1970s,the Fed-
eral Reserve System has expressed its intentions for
monetary policy in terms of the growth rates of various
monetaryand credit aggregates. TheFull Employment
and BalancedGrowth(Humphrey-Hawkins)Actof 1978
requires the System to set annual target ranges for the
aggregates and to report these targets to the Congress
twice a year. These reports also review the actual
behavior of the aggregates relative to their targets and
to the conditions in the economy that influenced both
the attainment and the appropriateness of the targets. I
The Federal Reservehas used three principal mone-
tary aggregates as policyindicators: Ml, whichconsists
of currency and checkable deposits; M2, which adds a
varietyof small-denomination savings-type instruments
issuedbybanks and other financial intermediaries; and
M3, which also includes certain large-denomination
instruments, such as largecertificates of deposit. Since
it includes onlycurrency and fullycheckable funds, Ml
traditionallywasregarded as primarilya "transactions"
aggregate,whereasM2and M3also contained "savings"
balances.
When the present definitions ofthe aggregates were
adopted in 1980,the principal distinction between the
two broader aggregates was that the deposit rates on
most instruments M2 were regulated by the Federal
Reserve, whereasthose on instrumentsoutsideM2 were
unregulated. The regulation of deposit rates meantthat
banks werenot able to manage closely the amounts of
their M2 liabilities, but instead were forced, at least in
the short run, to accept the quantities offered by their
customers at the regulated yields. In contrast, the
amounts outstanding of instruments outside M2 could
be controlled closely, since by altering their offering
rates, banks could attract more or less funds into these
so-called "managed liabilities."
Followingthe deregulation of deposit rates in recent
years, the differences between the aggregates have
33become less clear-cut. Individuals now use interest-
bearing checkingaccounts not onlyfortransactions pur-
poses, but also as repositories for savingsbalances, thus
blurring the distinction between Ml and M2. At the
same time, the deregulation of the yields on small time
deposits has madeit possible for banks to manage their
small-aswellastheir large-denomination liabilities, thus
reducing the difference between M2 and M3.
This article suggests an alternative classification of
monetary assets based on the distinction betweenthose
that have a stated term to maturity and those that do
not. In new deregulateddepositrates,
this classification may be more usefulthanthatembod-
ied in the present definitions of the aggregates. M2, as
currently defined, includes some assets that have no
specified term to maturity, and others small time
deposits - that have a fixed term. The suggested clas-
sification would alter the definition of M2 byexcluding
smalltimedeposits and combining them withlargetime
deposits in the non-M2 portion of M3.
The following Section I describes the present mone-
tary aggregates, explains their use as indicators for
monetary policy, and discusses how deregulation has
alteredtheirbehavior.SectionII introducesthe proposed
decomposition of M3 based on the distinction between
term and nonterm assets.
Section III reviewsthe receivedtheory of the demand
for money, and argues that this theory applies more
closely to the alternative monetary aggregates than to
the measures that the Federal Reserve currently uses.
Sections IV and V develop and estimate empirical
demand relations for both the official aggregates and
the alternatives. The results suggest that the demand
for the alternative measure of M2 has been more stable
in the face of deregulation. Section VI concludes.
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I. Deregulation and the Behavior of
Monetary Aggregates
The practice of relying on monetary aggregates as
guides to policyassumes thatthere isa close
andpredictable relation between monetarygrowth and
the macroeconomic variablesthatthe policymakercares
about: income, prices, and interest rates.
Until recently, the Federal Reserve focused its atten-
tion on Ml, which comprises outstanding
currency and fullycheckabledeposits, and corresponds
closely to the theoretical concept of "money" used by
many economists. Both economic theory and empirical
evidence suggested that Ml would be a reliable leading
indicator of realGNP and inflation. SinceMl wasfound
also to be subject to a reasonable degree of by
the Federal Reserve, it made senseto conduct monetary
policy in terms of the growth of this aggregate.
An important necessary condition for the use of any
monetary aggregate as a guide to policy is the
public's demand to hold it be a stable function of a
small number of variables thatare of interest to policy-
makers - income, prices, and interest rates. Until
recently, Ml was considered more likelyto satisfy this
condition becauseit wasused primarily asatransactions
rather thana savingsmedium, and so was to
few close substitutes.
This unique feature of Ml wasfosteredbyregulations
that set a ceiling on the rate of return that depository
institutions werepermitted to payon checkabledeposits.
This rate-ceiling on checkingaccounts gavemembers of
the public a strong incentive to limit their holdings of
these accounts to the minimum levelneeded for trans-
actions purposes, and to hold savings in
other forms that yielded higher returns. As a of
Ml'sunique role asa transactions a regu-
lated yield, changes in Ml's rate of growth
table effects on the interest yields on other financial
instruments, and thus, ultimately, on the levels real
GNP and prices.
broader monetaryaggregates,
expected to be less useful than Ml as indicators
monetary policy since they contained a mixture
savings funds and transactions balances and included
a number of financial instruments with market-
determined yields. Since these aggregates lacked
unique features, the public's demand to hold was
thought likelyto be affected bothbydifficult-to-predict
shifts in investor preferences among alternative instru-
ments andbychanges in the rates paid on those instru-
ments bytheir issuers. These problems werethought to
be lessseverein the caseof M2than of M3. The deposit
rates on most instruments in M2 weresubject to regula-Term vs, Nonterm
In light of these institutional developments, several
economists at the San Francisco Reserve Bank have
argued thatthe present dividing lines between Ml, M2,
and M3 may be less important than the single distinc-
tion betweendeposits that havea specified term to matu-
rity (term accounts) and those that have no fixed term
and are,forpractical purposes, withdrawableon demand
(nonterm accounts)." The aggregates formed by group-
ing financial instruments into these two classes are
described as TermM3 and Nonterm M3.8 Nonterm M3
includesall assets Ml, overnight repurchase agree-
ments and eurodollars, money market deposit accounts,
passbook savings accounts, and money market mutual
funds. Term M3 represents the remainder of M3, and
includes both small- and large-denomination time
deposits, term repurchase agreements, and term
eurodollars.
This grouping of financial assets differs from that
used by the Federal Reserve in two respects. -First,
the distinction between transactions (Ml) and other
nonterm instruments isde-emphasized. Second, small-
denomination time deposits are grouped with other term
accounts to form Term M3, rather than with nonterm
assets in M2. Currently, nonterm M3 represents about
55percentoftotal M3, whereasM2 represents about 80
percent.
Evidence of a change in the behavior of monetary
aggregates since the deregulation of deposit yields is
found in Charts 1,2 and 3. In Chart 1, the right panel
shows that the transactions (Ml) and nontransactions
components of Nonterm M3 havemoved together quite
closelyin recent years,whereasthe left panel showsthat
in earlier years the growth ofMl wasnot closelyrelated
to thatof other nonterm instruments. The visualimpres-
sion gained from these panels is.confirmed bystatistical
evidence. The correlation coefficient between the
monthly growth rates of the Ml and non-Ml compo-
nents of Nonterm M3 was only 0.24 (t-statistic 2.31)
between 1971 and June 1978, but increased to
0.59 (t-statistic 7.05)between July 1978and December
1986.9 This evidence suggests that, during much ofthe
1970s,the public regarded Ml as a uniquetransactions
vehicle,butthat sincederegulation, the behavior ofMl
has been similar to that of otherliquid nontransactions
accounts.
The two panels ofChart 2 show that there has been
a strong tendency forthe term and nontermcomponents
ofM3to movein opposite directions since 1978, but that
this inverserelationwasmuch weaker in the 1970s. The
correlation coefficientbetweenthe monthly growth rates
of term and nonterm M3more thandoubled from -0.39
removal ofthis regulatory distinction has made
deposits,morelikethose
werein 1980.Now that they are
offering rates on small as well as on
banks can and do use both as
wasnot possiblewhenthe yields
deposits were limited by regulatory ceil-
As a result, small deposits now are held
to deregulation, would have
favor of market instruments providing
tory ceilings, making them more similar to Ml than to
instruments outside M2 - all of which bore yields that
were market-determined.
Reducing Distinctions
Since 1978, virtually all of the restrictions on the
interest yieldspaidbybanks and other depositoryinsti-
tutions on their deposit liabilities gradually have been
phased out. 2 process of deregulation has had the
significantly reducing the distinctions between
aggregates. For example, the
interest-bearing checking accounts has
incentive for households to monitor care-
distribution of their liquid assetsbetweentrans-
nontransactions accounts. As a result, it
seems that checkable deposits now contain not
only transactions funds butalso savings balances, thus
uniqueness of MI.
Apparently as a result of the commingling oftrans-
nontransactions funds induced by deregu-
3 the formerly dose relation between Ml and the
behavior of real GNP and prices seems to have broken
in 1985. This breakdown led the Federal
Reserveto Ml,4and to put greater emphasis
on M2 as policy indicators. In 1987,no formal
target was set for growth.
ueposn··ra1:ederegulation also has lessened the dis-
unctionbetween M2 and M3. When the present defini-
the aggregates wereadopted in 1980,
assets M2 were thought to be similar' even
though they included both savings deposits that could
liquidated more or less on demand, and small time
terms to maturity. M2assetswere
the large-denomination instruments
because those instruments are not
federal deposit insurance, but also, and
importantly, because returns on most M2assets
regulated, whereasthose oninstruments outsideM2
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36In contrast, rates on MMDAs, passbook savings,and
NOW accounts are adjusted more slowly. The fourth
column in Table 1, for example, shows a regression of
the MMDAyieldon thecommercialpaper rate that indi-
cates that this rate adjusts slowly and incompletely to
changes in competing yields.14
All this evidence suggeststhat since the deregulation
of deposit rates, the Federal Reserve's distinction
between M2andM3 may have become lessmeaningful
than that between nonterm and term assets. Today, it
appears that the term and nonterm components ofM3
representsarelatively group
cial instruments. Each group ismanaged differently by
the intermediaries thatissue it, and, as discussed in the
following section, performs a different function in the
public's portfolio of wealth.
(t-statistic 3.95) between January 1971 and June 1978
to -0.84 (t-statistic 14.75) betweenJuly 1978 and Decem-
ber 1986.
10 This evidence suggests that nonterm and
term M3 now represents a grouping of similar
assets. This waslesstrue before 1978 becausesmalltime
regulated, behaved more like nonterm
saving accounts than large term assets.
Conversely, Chart 3 shows that the tendency for the
M2 was
quite the period deregulation, but has
been weakerin recent years.The correlation betweenthe
nrrr\urth rates M2 non-M2 M3
1971 to 1978 to (t-
statistic 3.70)between 1978and 1986.
11
, 12 This evidence
suggeststhat, in the earlier period, M2and non- M2M3
each an aggregate of similar assets, but that
has been reduced deregulation
because small time deposits now behave more likelarge
term accounts than nonterm accounts.
~,,,~th,~revidencethat small time deposits now behave
large-denomination term accounts than like
components of M2 was presented in a recent
paper in this Review. 13 Using a vector autoregression
approach, this paper showed that, in the post-
deregulation period, the response of the growth rate of
small time deposits to interest rate shocks was similar
to that of large term accounts, butquite different from
that of either M1 or the non-Ml nonterm components
ofM2. In contrast, before deregulation, the responseof
thegrowth of small time deposits to interest rate shocks
was similar to that ofM1 and ofother components of
and quitedifferent from thatof large-denomination
term accounts. The authors attributed the changed
behavior of small time accounts to the deregulation of
deposit rates on these accounts, which has transformed
them into managed liabilities.
Additional evidence that depository institutions use
small time deposits as managed liabilities comes from
examining how the yield on these deposits responds to
changes in market rates on competing short-terminstru-
ments. and third columns of 1report
regression equations explaining the response of offer-
rates onsmall and largetime deposits to current and
one-monthcommercial paper rate
period since early 1983. These equations
show that banksnow adjusttheiroffering rates on both
classes of time deposits quickly and fully to changes in
othershort-term yields. Withintwo months of a risein
the commercial paper rate, yields on both short- and
long-termtime deposits risebya roughlyequal amount.
The response isonly slightlylessrapid inthecaseof small
time deposits,indicating that banks manage these small-
denomination liabilities almost as closelyas large CDs.
37Holding Wealth as Money
For Keynes, the principal reason money
as a store ofwealth (that is, over and above the amount
needed for purelytransactions purposes) wasuncertainty
regarding the future rate of interest on cp>r·",.,t,,>c
argued that if there were no uncertainty
rates of interest, the present future values
securities also would be known, an investor
would have no incentive to hold his
of money. 18
Since the future rate ofinterest is in fact uncertain,
"there is a risk ofa loss being incurred in purchasing a
clear that it referred to a demandto hold assets
immediatecommandover goodsand services
ence to ones thatrequire partingwith thatcommandfor
a period oftime. Thus, liquidity to
a demand for nonterm assets in general, and not
for those that are used as means of 17
II. The Theory of Money Demand
Although economists and policymakers have not
emphasizedthe distinction between term and nonterm
instrumentsin thepostwar period, this wayofclassify-
ing assets is not a new one. It underlay much of John
Maynard Keynes's discussion ofthe demand for money
in his General Theory't more than a half-century ago.
Instead of "the demand for money," Keynes used the
term "liquidity preference," and made it clear that this
was a broadconceptthatwas not limitedto the demand
for assets that function as means of payment.
In distinguishing between "money" and "debts,"
Keynes emphasizedthedifference betweenthoseassets
that can be converted into spendable cash quickly and
withoutriskofcapitalloss, andthosethat have a stated
termto maturityandcanbe liquidatedbefore maturity
only at some risk or cost. Although many later
economists equatedliquidity preference with the demand
for transactions balances," Keynes himself made it
38long-term debt and subsequently turning it into cash,
as comparedwith holding cash,"andit isbecause of this
risk oflosson securities thatinvestors holdpartof their
wealth the form of money. Keynes described this
"desire for security as to the future cash equivalent of
a certainproportion of total resources" as the "precau-
tionary motive" for holding money.
A second reason for holding wealth in the form of
money, Keynes argued, wasto speculate on future move-
ments of the rate of interest. According to this "specula-
tive motive," an investor will prefer to holdmoney if he
expects interest rates to rise, since the holding of secu-
rities willexpose him to a capitalloss. Conversely, if he
expects interest rates to fall, an investor will anticipate
obtaining a capital gain on holdings ofsecurities, and
hence will tend to switch out ofmoney into securities.
Since the speculative motive for liquidity preference
depends on the investor believing that he knows the
future better than the market,19 it too depends on the
presence of uncertaintyandwould not exist if all future
interest rates were known for sure.
Although Keynesemphasized the role ofuncertainty
about future rates of interest, he did recognize that
an individual also will have a motive to hold money
when he is uncertain about his future receipts or
expenditures. Ifthese flows were hard to predict, an
individual would want to hold a stock ofliquid funds
to "provide for contingencies requiring sudden expen-
diture and for unforeseen opportunitiesof advantageous
purchases" (General Theory, p. 196).
Uncertaintyabout future needs for liquid funds and
about future interest rates bothprovide "precautionary"
motives to hold money." These motives are not
independent. The effects on an individual of being
uncertain whether or when he will need to sell securi-
ties, in order to obtain liquid funds to spend, are com-
pounded when future securityprices also are uncertain.
Conversely, the effects of interest rate uncertaintywould
be significantly reduced if there were no uncertainty
about future incomes and outlays because an investor
could tailor the maturities ofthe securities in his port-
folio to ensure that he never hadto sellsecurities before
matured.
However, theorists since Keynes have argued that
uncertainty about future needs for spendable funds will
lead to a demand for money evenif there wereno interest
rate uncertainty. This is because there are transaction
costs in exchanging non-money assets for money, even
when there is no uncertainty about the value ofthose
assets. These transaction costs of liquidating assets
include not only explicit "brokerage fees," but also
implicit "shoe-leather" and "inconvenience" costs. If the
individual were uncertain of how frequently he would
needto liquidate assetsto obtaincash to make payments,
he might find it advantageousto holdpartofhis wealth
in the form of money to reduce the risk of incurring
those transaction costs. This precautionary demand"
would depend not only on the degree of uncertainty
about future needs for cash, but also on thesize ofthe
transaction costs" avoided by holding money rather
than non-money assets.
Money as a Nonterm Asset
Eachofthesemotives for holding wealthin the form
of"money" is more closely related to money's being a
nonterm asset, that givesmore or less immediate com-
mand over goods and services, than to its being the
medium of exchange. All are motives for holding liquid
assets in general, and not only assets that are means of
exchange.
This clearly isthe case in the environmentenvisioned
by Keynes, in which "money" and "securities" are the
only assets available. Securities are term assets, and
Keynesassumed thatallsecuritiesare tradedin organized
markets. An investor can liquidatehis security holdings
before maturity only by selling them in these markets.
He would then sustain a capital loss if interest rates
have risen (security prices have declined), and obtain a
capital gain if rates have fallen.
The larger the proportionofhis wealth thathe has in
securities with a fixed term to maturity, thegreater are
both his risk of capital loss and his opportunity for
speculative gain if he sellsthembefore maturity. Hence,
whendecidinghow much of his portfolio to hold in secu-
rities and how much in other assets, the investor must
consider the trade-offbetweenrisk andreturnandmake
judgmentsaboutthefuture course of interest rates and
security prices. In making this decision, the crucial
choice is between assets thathave a fixed termtomatu-
rity and thatcan be liquidated only by being sold at an
uncertain andvarying market price, andthosethatcan
be liquidated at their face valuemore or lesson demand.
Whether the latter function as a medium of exchange
is of secondary importance.
In fact, "securities"are not the only termassets avail-
able. Investors also can hold wealth in the form oftime
deposits for which, exceptinthe caseoflarge CDs issued
bymoney centerbanks, there isno organizedmarketin
whichan investorcan liquidate hisholdings beforematu-
rity. Thus, the interest rate uncertainties emphasizedby
Keynes do not apply to time deposits. However,although
there isno "secondarymarket" in time deposits, in most
casesthe investorcan withdraw his funds beforematurity
by paying an "early withdrawal" penalty. This penalty
represents the transactioncost of liquidating his deposit
39small-denomination time deposits - were regulated.
During that period, the risk of holding a small time
account instead ofa nonterm account was confined to
the early withdrawal penaltythatwas if the inves-
tor wished to liquidate it before maturity. Because the
rate ceilingson term and nonterm M2 assets wereseldom
changed, there was little difference interest rate
risk to holding nonterm or small time deposits,
would an a
"speculative" motive for preferring nonterm deposits.
This may have reduced the importance of
between term nonterm accounts
M2.
The deregulation of deposit rates on
deposits should havereversed effects, strengthening
the distinctionbetweenterm nonterm !UI'1' ~~rl
ing the uniqueness of M2. As discussed in
ing section, this deregulation has made it possible
depository institutions to use deposits as
"managedliabilities."And, as a result, the deposit rates
on these accounts now change more frequently
follow market yields more closely. Small time deposits
now are more similar to the large-denomination term
accounts outside M2 thanto mostofthe nontermassets
in M2. Although there are no regulatory on
the yields on nontermdeposits, banks adjust these rates
sluggishly." Thus both term and nonterm M3 now
consist ofa grouping of similar assets, whereas M2 con-
tains a mixture ofdifferent kinds of instruments, mC1UCl-
ing both managed and non-managed liabilities.
Statistical Evidence
The statistical evidence presented earlier in connec-
tion with Charts 1-3supports this argumentthat uerezu-
lation has weakened the uniqueness of M2 and made the
distinction between term and nonterm M3 a more signi-
ficant one. Thatevidenceshowed thatthe negativecorre-
lation between theM2 andnon-M2 components M3
weakened betweenthe 1971-1978 and 1978-1986 periods,
whilethat between nonterm andterm M3 strengthened,
In addition, there isevidencethatthese changes
behavior oftheaggregates were the of
of deregulation on small time deposits. Before 1978,
therewas only a small andnegative correlation between
the monthlygrowth rates ofsmall time deposits andthe
non-M2 component of M3 (correlation coefficient
-0.30, t-statistic 3.00), whereas since 1978,this relation
has been positive and highly significant (correlation
coefficient0.62, t-statistic7.02). Similarly, the correla-
tion between the monthly growth rates ofnonterm M3
and small time deposits wassignificantly positive (corre-
lation coefficient 0.43, t-statistic 4.53) in the pre-
deregulation period, but has been strongly negative
Fundamental Distinction
This discussion suggests that thedistinction between
nontermandtermassets may be a fundamental one and
those between transactions and nontransactions
accounts or between M2 and non-M2 accounts may be
of secondary importance. Because term assets can be
liquidatedonly at an uncertain price or at the cost ofan
early withdrawal penalty, whereas nonterm assets give
more or less immediate command over goods and
services with little risk and at low cost, there are sound
economic reasons for investors to separate their stocks
of wealth into holdings of term and nonterm assets.
Bycontrast, in theabsence ofgovernment regulation,
there would be little incentive for individuals to separate
their transactions funds from the rest oftheir nonterm
balances. Thus, the uniqueness ofM1may have been an
artifact of the regulation that prohibitedbanks from pay-
inga market-determined rate of return on checkable
deposits, and thus may have disappeared with the
removal ofthat restriction. As Chart 1 illustrates, the
change in the relation betweenthe transactions (M1)and
nontransactions componentsofnontermM3 coincided
approximately with the phasing outofthat regulation.
The regulation ofinterest yields on other classes of
deposits may have had a similar effect in contributing
to the uniqueness of M2. Before 1978, the rates that
financial institutions were permitted to pay on most
accounts included in M2 - including both nonterm and
early. As discussed earlier, if the investor wereuncertain
ofhis future needs for spendablefunds, the presenceof
a transaction cost would provide an incentive to hold a
portion of wealth in liquid form rather than time
deposits. Again, however, this motive for liquidity
applies to all nontermassets and not only to thosethat
are used as themediumofexchange. This isbecauseall
such assets may be liquidated with little risk" and at
low cost.
Most depositoryinstitutions permit depositors to shift
funds among different types of nonterm savingsdeposits
andbetweensavingsand transactions accounts at no cost
and with only minor restrictions." Since these various
nonterm assets are easily converted into the medium of
exchange, there is little need for the individual investor
either to consider carefully his future needs for spend-
able cash or to make judgments about future interest
rates when deciding how to allocate wealth between
them; In other words, the factors that give rise to the
precautionaryand speculative demands for "money"in
preference to "debts" apply mainly to decisions between
holding"nontermassets" and"termassets,"andare less
important to decisions regarding the various kinds of
transactions and other nonterm instruments.
40(correlation coefficient -0.85, t-statistic 15.37) since
deregulation. Thus, itappears that the deregulation of
small time deposits has caused them to behavemorelike
CDs and not like nonterm instruments.
argument of this section suggests that a defini-
"money" thatisbased on the distinctionbetween
nonterm and term assets might yield an aggregate that
would provide a better indicator for monetary policy
currentlv in use. A grouping of assets that
are similar, in sense that they performsimilar func-
tions in the public's asset portfolio andare treatedsimi-
is more
to than one, such as the
present M2, that contains dissimilar assets. Moreover,
a grouping, such as the present Ml, thatexcludes some
assets are similar to those that it includes, also is
to be lessuseful. In the next sections of this paper,
these ideas are tested by estimating demand functions
for nonterm and term M3 and comparing them with
similar functions for the traditional aggregates.
HI. Empirical Considerations
The precedingsection argued thattheuniqueness of
bothMl andM2 may have been partlythe result ofthe
regulation ofdepositrates, and that, sincederegulation,
a decompositionofM3 into its nontermandterm com-
ponents islikelyto producemore homogeneousgroups
of assets. Simple correlation tests supported these
hypotheses.Toprovidestronger tests, demand functions
for alternative aggregates wereestimated overtwo sam-
plesthatcorrespond approximately to the pre-and post-
deregulation periods.
Roughlyspeaking, the deregulation processproceeded
in two partially overlapping phases. In the first phase,
which began in July 1978, financial institutions were
authorized to issue small-denomination time deposits
of varying maturities yielding market rates ofreturn.26
Bythe end of1982,this phase waslargelycomplete, and
most restrictions on the deposit rates payable on term
accounts in M2 (that is, small time deposits) had been
removed." The deregulation of yields on nonterm
accounts began in January 1981, when depositoryinsti-
tutions nationwide were permitted to offer interest-
bearing checkable deposits (NOW accounts). Two years
later, money market deposit accounts and checkable
(Super-NOW) accounts with no minimummaturityand
no ceilingson their yieldswereauthorized. This second
phase ofderegulation was completed in 1986,with the
removal of minimum balance limitations on Super-
NOWaccounts and ofinterest rate ceilingson passbook
savingaccounts. These last changes eliminated the final
restrictions on nonterm deposits.
Sample Periods
For estimation purposes, the sample periods chosen
were January 1971 to June 1978and January 1981 to
December 1986. In the first period, the rates on most
small-denominationdeposits, bothtermandnonterm,
were regulated, making M2 somewhat unique. These
regulations therefore favored the traditional decompo-
sition ofM3 and made a breakdown between term and
nonterm assets less useful." In the second period, the
deregulation of most deposit rates favored the term-
nonterm decomposition.
Duringthe two-and-a-halfyears between these sam-
ple periods, growth in the monetary aggregates was
influenced not only bya seriesof deregulation measures
butalso bycertain special factors, includingthe change
in the Federal Reserve'sshort-run operatingprocedures
in October 1979and the imposition of credit controls
between March andJuly 1980. Hence, this period was
excluded from bothsamples. In addition, in viewofthe
huge swing that occurred in the demand for nonterm
41ing variable on the theory that money serves as
mediumofexchangeandincomeis a proxymeasure of
the flow oftransactions that use money. Although the
emphasis ofthis paperon monetaryaggregates as stores
of value suggests using some measure of the stock
wealth as a scale variable, this was not no
monthlymeasure ofwealth is available. Quarterly
mates ofa varietyofwealth concepts do exist
been the estimation
tions for monetary aggregates.
Over the period since 1970,thelong-run
rate ofnominal wealth has been doseto
income, suggesting thattheestimated
ity ofmoney demand with respect to
similar to its income elasticity. HC1IWPVPT
wealth dataindicatethatshort-runfluctuations
wealth are not closely related to vanations
probably because those fluctuations reflect changes in
the market value of assets, especially equities. In
equations estimated in this paper, the level of income
may serve as a proxyfor thelong-run growth
and changes in the interest rate as a proxy
variations in its market value.F
A second comment with regard to 1 con-
cerns the interest rate variable. In general,
to hold a monetaryaggregateis affected not
market rate on competing instruments
own-rate ofreturn on the instruments in
sincethe spreadbetweenthese rates represents oppor-
tunitycost ofholdingtheaggregate. When deposit rates
were strictly regulated, changes rate
produced equal changes in this spread.
tion, movements in the yield on competmg rr'lclrlc,Pf
instruments no longer imply
becausedepositoryinstitutions alter
in response to changes in market
This institutional change suggests
estimates ofthe demand
includea measure of own-rateas
rate. In preliminary of
in this paper, this approach was
were found to be either or implausible,
source of this problem may be that
aggregate consists ofa "",'r'P1r" instruments
different yields. As a result, no single empirical
ure captures fully the own-rate on a given aggregate,
the opportunity cost of holding
Since own-rates respond" - albeit
rates - to changes in market rates, the demand
each aggregate may be expressed as depending
market rates in the long run. This is approach>
adopted in Equation 1.This long-run relation represents
an equilibrium not only in the sense that investors
~log M, = f + g et _ 1 + ~ hp ~log M, _ p
p
+ ~ kq ..6..log Y, _ q + E ms ..6..R t _ s
q s
(2)
assets when Money Market Deposit Accounts and
Super-NOW accounts wereintroduced, the three-month
period from December 1982 to February 1983 was
excluded'" from the second sample.
Modeling
The long-run relation used here is of the form:
Inertia
All empirical specifications of the demand for the
monetaryaggregates musttake accountoftheapparent
inertiain the response ofthe public's demand for money
assets to changes in the macroeconomic variables that
most common ways
handling this inertia are the partial adjustment
specification or the use of explicit distributed lags.
In this paper the error-correction specification
proposed by David Hendry" is used. This specification
is similar to the partial adjustment approach in distin-
guishingbetweenthe equilibrium moneydemandjunc-
tion, which defines the long-run relation between the
public's desired holding of money assets andthe macro-
economic variables that determine it, and a short-run
adjustment model, whichdescribes the dynamic process
by which money demand adjusts to its long-run
equilibrium in response to changes in those determin-
ing variables.
where M, = monetary aggregate, Y, = nominal in-
come, R, = a short-run market interest rate, and et is
an errortermrepresenting the extent to which the pub-
lic's actual money stock diverges from its equilibrium
level.
The short-run adjustment of money demand in a
given month is assumed to depend both on the diver-
gence between its actual and equilibrium levels at the
beginning of the month, et _ l' and on current and
lagged changes in the determining variables:
Twocomments are in order with regard to the long-
run relation in Equation 1.First, the "scale"variable is
assumed to be nominal personal income . Standard
money demandrelations employ income as a determin-
42fully adjusted their asset portfolios to the market con-
ditions they face, but also that depository institutions
have adjusted the yields on the instruments they
36
In equations estimatedin this paper, the standard
error-correctionadjustment specificationrepresented by
Equation 2 was extended to include an additionalvari-
able to capture the indirect effect on the monetary
variations in demand for loans from
depository institutions.37
Suppose there isanincrease in the demand for bank
an to attract
by deposit rates, thereby
public's demandto holdmonetaryassets.
estimated equations wereto includetheown-rates
monetary aggregates in addition to the market
this "bank loan" effect would be captured in a
narrowing ofthe spread between the marketrate and the
own-rates. However, since the equations include only
themarket rate, this effect is capturedinstead by adding
change in thevolume ofbankloans as an additional
variable. This variable is expected to be moreimportant
in the demand equations for timedeposits, since banks
manage these deposits (by varying their deposit rates)
more the short run.
WhenEquation 1is substitutedinto Equation2, and
thebankloans variable is added, weobtainEquation3.
M :::::
t
paperrate adjustedto a bond-yieldbasis. For each pair
ofaggregates, thedemandequations were estimatedby
"seemingly-unrelated regression," an estimation method
thatassumes thatthe errors in the two equations are con-
temporaneously correlated." This estimation method
was suggested by the theoretical discussionin theprevi-
ous section. Since different monetaryaggregates are sub-
stitutesin the investor's asset portfolio, a randomshock
that affects the demand for one aggregate would be
expected also to affect the other aggregate.
f - g (log Mt _ 1 - a
M, _ p + E kq .6,.log Y, _ q
q
(3)
+ E - s + n .6,.LOANSt
where .6,.LOANSt represents the monthly change in
bank loans." In this equation, b represents the long-
runincomeelasticity ofdemand for aggregate, and
c multiplied by the levelofthe interest rate is the long- .
run interest elasticity. The stock of the monetary
aggregateapproaches long-runequilibriumlevelmore
quickly when the coefficient on the lagged level of the
aggregate, g, is large, and those on the changes in the
aggregate, income and the interest rate (hp' kq and m.)
are small."
Equations in the form ofEquation 3 were estimated
for two pairs ofmonetary aggregates: (i) Nonterm and
M3, and (ii) M2 and Non-M2 M3. The income
variable used was nominal personal income and the
market interest rate was the one-month commercial
43IV. Results
The estimation results are shown in Tables 2 and 3.
In bothtables, estimates are shown bothfor the pre- and
post-deregulationsample periods separately and for the
twoperiodstogether. Both pairs ofequationsfit the data
closely with plausiblevalues for the coefficients. None
of the equations exhibits significant evidence of
autocorrelation in the residuals that would indicate
misspecification or the omission ofimportant variables.
As expected, the response of aggregates to market
interest rates has changed siznificantlv in of
deregulation. Bothterm and nonterm become
more homogeneous aggregates more to
market interest rates since 1981. In case
non-M2 M3, deregulation has had the opposite
Table 2 shows that in the 1981-86 sample V'-"'JU,
long-run demand for term M3 was significantly
positively to market interest
44changes also hada significant positive short-runimpact
on term M3.
41 Conversely,the demand for nonterm M3
respondednegatively to marketinterest rates in boththe
short and the long run. Theseresultsreflectthe fact that,
sincederegulation, depository institutions haveadjusted
their offering rates on allterm accounts, including small-
denomination time deposits, quickly and fully in
response to changes in market rates, whereas rates on
nonterm accounts have been adjusted more slowly.As
a result, an increase in the general level of short-term
interest rates makes term instruments more attractive
relative to nonterm assets, and causes investors to shift
from nonterm into term M3.
By contrast, in the pre-I978 period, the impact of
interest rate changes on term M3, although positive,was
very small and not statistically significant in either the
shortor the long run. Similarly,changesin market rates
had negative,butsmall, effectson nontermM3. Because
the yields on small-denominationtimedeposits in term
M3wereregulatedin this period, term M3 aggregate
included a mixture of regulated andunregulatedinstru-
ments. As a result, a rise in market rates madethe hold-
45assets has become more responsive
for term assets less responsive. Cnanges
income (.6.logY) had an immediate nosittve impact
thedemandto holdnonterm
period; this impact effect was smaller
cally significant in the earlier p"" 'V'A.
The increased responsiveness nonterm M3 to
changes in income since deregulation is consistent
Keynes'sviewthat, in the absence
tions on their yields, all nonterm assets are CHU.H"'"
because all givemore or less over
goods and services.
Although not a principal concern
notable that changes in bank
effect on the demand for the term
acceleration of bank loans increases
in M2 respond slowlyto changes in market rates.
the immediate effect of higher market rates isto increase
the opportunity costs of holding these components
the aggregate, and therefore to
As the deposit yields adjust to market
run effect dissipates.
Thelong-run demand
aggregates is positively related to income." Although
themostobvious of rate deregulation
been to alter the response of the demands
aggregates to changes in market interest
some change
ing oflarge term deposits more attractive (because their
yieldsrose in line with market rates), but simultaneously
increased the opportunity costs ofholding small time
deposits making them less attractive. Since an increase
in market rates had opposing effects on the demands for
small and large term deposits in this period, it did not
cause a significant net shift offunds between nonterm
and term M3.
In the case oftheM2 andnon-M2components of M3,
the deregulation of deposit rates has made M2 a less
homogeneous aggregate and caused it to become less
responsive to rate changes. 3 shows
before deregulation, boththe immediate and long-run
effects ofa rise in marketrates wereto reduce M2. Con-
versely,theeffectofanincreasein market rates on non-
M2 M3 was significantly positive. Sincethe components
ofnon-M2M3 were unregulated, a rise in market rates
induced depository institutions to raise their yields and
made these assets more attractive relative to both the
nonterm andthe small-denominationterminstruments
in M2 - the rates on which were regulated. As a result,
a rise in market rates led investors to substitute out of
M2 into non-Mz M3.
TheM2 equationestimated for theperiodsince 1981
shows thatthe long-run negative effect ofmarket rates
on M2 is now smallandnotstatisticallysignificant, but
thata small, althoughstatisticallysignificant, negative
impact remains in the short run. This short-runimpact
persists becausetheyieldson most of the nontermassets
46The resultsof this testwereinconclusive.Table4shows
the mean errors and root mean squared errors from these
simulations for each year. In four out of the six years
since 1981, the term-nonterm decomposition yielded
slightly more accurate (that is, lower meanerror) fore-
casts of the annualgrowth rate ofaggregateM3, butthe
differences are notlarge. Intermsofrootmeansquared
error, there was no difference between the two models'
monthly forecasting accuracy.
both term M3 and non-M2 M3, confirming the
banks do respond to increases in the
byaddingto their managedliabilities.
preceding discussion has focused atten-
deregulation in altering the esti-
coefficients of the equations in Table 2 and 3,
these changes were not large. Only in the case of the
M2 may the hypothesis thatthe coefficients
remained unchanged between the two sample periods
reiected at a reasonable significance level.43 It was
nrevious section that the deregulation of
on time deposits underminedthe unique
M2 and thus could be expected to cause the
demand for thataggregate to shift. The empirical results
out
The argument also suggestsderegulation would
affected demand for term M3, butnotthat for
non-M2 M3, sincethe former wasa mixture of regulated
unregulated instruments before 1978 whilethe latter
was deregulated. There is some indication thatthe
demand for non-M2 M3 was more robust in the face of
deregulationthan was nonterm M3, butthe evidence is
not strong."
both the short- and long-run
interest rate changes on the demand for non-
term M3 have been stronger than they were in the
45 Although changes in market rates still have a
"",rwr_,"",,,, impacton the demandfor M2, the estimated
long-run interest rate elasticity of this demand has
declined since deregulation and isno longer statistically
significant. Since the principal link between monetary
actions and the economy is through changes in
<:l1,(\rt_t"'rrn interest rates, it may be preferable to use as
a policyindicatoran aggregatethatissystematically and
negatively related to rates. However, the interest-rate
elasticity of the demand for nonterm M3 is larger than
that of other aggregates used as indicators in the past.
cause problems in setting a target range for
nonterm M3 because its growth would tend to be more
of traditional aggregates.
test of the usefulness of the term-nonterm
twopairs of equations estimated overthe
were simulated dynamically from 1981 to
results of these in-sample simulations were
combined to yield two sets of simulated values oftotal
. The monthly growth rates of simulated M3 were
computed and comparedwith actual M3 growth. Ifthe
rI""~,,.,..... of M3 alongterm-to-maturitylines were more
meaningful, one would expect to find thatthe simulated
values of M3 growth constructed from the simulation
of nonterm and term equations exhibit smaller errors
those constructed from the M2 and non-M2
equations.
47V. Conclusions
Since de-emphasizing MI, the Federal Reserve has
used broader monetary aggregates - M2 and
M3 - as indicators for policy. During the 1970s, the
principal differences between these two aggregates was
that the rates of return on the instruments in M2 were
mostly regulated, whereasthoseon instruments outside
M2 wereunregulated. The deregulation of deposit rates
since 1978has ended this distinction.
This paperhas examined an alternative pairof mone-
aggregates formed by M3 assets
have a stated term to maturity and those that do
not. Instruments with a stated maturity are described
as term assets, whilethose with no set maturitydate are
nonterm assets.
The distinction between nonterm and term assets
is similar to that between money and debts used by
Maynard Keynes in the discussion of liquiditypreference
in his General Theory. Keynesargued that all nonterm
assets are similar because they give (more or less)
immediate command over goods and services. Today,
investors may substitute between nonterm instruments
at lowtransaction costs and with little risk. Thus, non-
term M3 represents a grouping of similar types of assets.
The uniqueness of M2 (and ofMl) appears to have
resulted from the existence of regulatory ceilings on the
yields thatdepositoryinstitutions paid on their deposit
liabilities. These rate ceilings notonly gaveinvestors an
incentive to minimize the amounts oftheir wealth held
in the regulatedinstruments, all of whichwerecontained
in M2, but also madeit impossible for depository insti-
tutionsto use small time deposits as managed liabilities.
With the removal these rate ceilings,these unique fea-
tures of M2 have disappeared. This aggregate now
includes bothterm and nonterminstruments and both
managed and nonmanagedliabilities;itscomponents are
no longer similar either from the viewpoint of their
holders or their issuers.
Empirical estimates ofthe demand for nonterm M3
suggest "aggregate" been somewhat more
robust in the face ofderegulation than the demand for
M2, as would have been expectedif the unique features
of M2 werethe result ofregulation. While the interest
rate elasticity of M2 has become small and insignificant
in the aftermath of deregulation, the elasticity ofnon-
term M3 remains negative and highlysignificant. These
results supportthe theoretical arguments for preferring
nonterm M3 overM2 as a policy indicator, althoughthe
greater volatility of nonterm M3 could make it more
difficult to set targets for this aggregate than for M2.
These considerations suggest that both aggregates
deserve to be monitored in the future.
48FOOTNOTES
1. The Humphrey-Hawkins law does not require that the Fed-
eral Reserve'stargetsfor the monetary aggregates be achieved,
but only that the System explain to Congress the reasonsforany
revisions to or deviations from those plans.
2. Today,the sole remaining regulatory restriction on deposit
yields is that depository institutions are not permitted to pay
interest on traditional demand deposits. However, since most
such deposits are held by businesses that receive implicit
returns in the form of bank services provided below cost, even
this restriction may not be a binding one.
Households have the option of either noninterest-bearing
demand deposits or interest-bearing NOW accounts. Presum-
ably those who select the former do so because oflower feesor
minimum balance requirements and thus are,in effect,receiving
an implicit return that exceedsthe explicit yield they would earn
on a NOW account. The regulatory ceiling on demand deposits
therefore is not a binding constraint on households either.
Hence, the only effective interest rate "restriction" is the zero
return on the public's holdings of currency.
3. Some evidence that the changed behavior of M1 may be
attributed to the process of deregulation is presented in John
P Judd and Bharat Trehan, "PortfolioSubstitution and the Relia-
bility of M1, M2 and M3 as Monetary Indicators," Economic
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Summer 1987
4. The relation between the growth of M1 and the behavior of
real GNP and prices also appeared to go off track in 1982-83.
Although at the time this led the Federal Reserve to de-
emphasize M1 in its policy deliberations,there isstrong evidence
thatthe "greatvelocity decline" was not caused by a shift inthe
demand for M1 but rather by the unusually sharp decline in
nominal interest rates associated with the winding down of infla-
tion in 1982. See John P Judd and Brian Motley, "The 'Great
Velocity Decline' of 1982-83: A Comparative Analysis of M1 and
M2," Economic Review, Federal ReserveBank ofSan Francisco,
Summer 1984.
5. The rationale for the present definitions of the aggregates is
discussed in Thomas D. Simpson, "The Redefined Monetary
Aggregates," Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1980.
6. These assets still are not perfect substitutes since the instru-
ments outside M2 are not federally insured, whereas small time
deposits are insured.
7. See, for example, John P Judd, Brian Motley and Bharat Ire-
han, "FinancialChange and the Design of Monetary Policy: Les-
sons from the U.S. Experience,"paper presented forthe Seventh
Pacific Basin Central Bank Conference on Economic Modeling,
Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney, Australia, 1986; Judd and
Trehan, "PortfolioSubstitution ... ,"op.cit.; and Judd and Trehan,
'Velocity in the 1980s: An Analysis of Interactions among Mone-
tary Components," paper presented at Western Economics
Association International Conference,Vancouver, B.c.,July 1987
8. SeeJudd and Trehan, "PortfolioSubstitution... ," op.cit., 1987
9. This second correlation coefficient excludes the credit
control period, from March to July 1980, and the period
immediately following the introduction of Money Market Deposit
Accounts and Super-NOW Accounts, from December 1982
to February 1983.
10. See footnote 9.
11. See footnote 9.
12. If the Federal Reserve were to follow a policy of closely
controlling the growth oftotal M3,any pair of components ofthis
aggregate would tend to be negatively correlated, and itwould
be difficultto draw conclusions from these charts and correla-
tions. In fact, however, although the System has set annual
targets for M3, it has not conducted policy with a view to con-
trolling its growth closely in the short run.
13. Judd and Trehan, "Portfolio Substitution... ," op. cit., 198?
14. For a careful discussion of the rate-setting behavior of
depository insntutionsinrecent years,see Richard D. Porter, Paul
A.Spindtand David E. Lindsey, "Econometric Modeling of the
Demands for the U.S. MonetaryAggregates: Conventional and
Experimental Approaches," paper presented at the Seventh
Pacific Basin Central Bank Conference on Economic Modeling,
Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney, Australia, 1986.
15. John Maynard Keynes, TheGeneral Theory ofEmployment
Interest and Money, London, Macmillan, 1936.
16. Not all economists have taken this approach. Milton
Friedman, for example, has consistently argued that money
should be defined broadly.
17. See,for example, the quotation from the General Theory at
the beginning ofthis article.Although Keynes did not saysospe-
cifically, it is clear that his concept of "money" was not limited
to assets yielding a zero or regulated rate of return. No such
regulations existed in Britain at the time Keynes was writing the
General Theory.
18. "If the current rate of interest is positive for debts of every
maturity, it must always be more advantageous to purchase a
debt than to hold cash as a store of wealth," General Theory,
p. 169.Keynes isassuming here that the yield on money iszero
and also that there are no transaction costs in buying or selling
securities. Ifmoney bears interest or ifthere are costs involved
in exchanging securities for money, investors may have an
incentive to hold money even if securities provide a positive
return with no risk. The role of transaction costs isdiscussed in
more detail below.
19. The speculative motive has "the object of securing profit
from knowing better than the market what the future will bring
forth," General Theory, p. 170.
20. In the General Theory, Keynes uses the phrase "precau-
tionary motive" intwo senses. In his early discussions of liquidity
preference (Chapter 13), he stresses the uncertainty of future
rates of interest as a motivefor holding a portion of total wealth
inthe form of money. Later(Chapter 15), he ascribes the precau-
tionary motive to uncertainty with regard to future spending
streams.
21. For a theoretical discussion of this motive, see David E. W.
Laidler, The Demand for Money: Theories, Evidence and
Problems, Third Edition, New York, Harper and Row, 1985,
pp.64-69.
22. Keynes did recognize therole of these costs but chose not
to analyze them in detail. For example, in a clear reference to
what later economists described as "transaction costs," he
pointed out that 'there is no need to hold idle cash ...if it can
be obtained withoutdifficulty at the momentwhen it is actually
49required," General Theory, p. 196.
23. That is,there isno interest rate risk. Inthe case of uninsured
deposits, there issome default risk, whether these are nonterm
or term assets.
24. Several types of nonterm assets available (for example,
money market deposit accounts and money market mutual
funds) permit a limited number of payments or funds transfers
to be made each month by check or electronically. Thus, the
"shoe-leather" or "inconvenience" costs of liquidating these
assets are small.
25. Thismay be because increasesindeposit rateson nonterm
deposits must be paid to all holders, whereas higher yields on
time accountsapply only to new holders. This explanation sug-
gests that banks should respond more slowly to increases than
to decreases in market yields. There is some evidence that in
setting their offering rates on MMDAs and NOW accounts,
banks move more rapidly to reduce their offering rates when
market rates fall than they do to increase them when market
rates rise. See Porter,Spindt and Lindsey, "Econometric Model-
ling ofthe Demands for the U.S. Monetary Aggregates... ,"Opus
cit. However, this conclusion is based on only a short sample
period, during most of which interest rates were falling.
26. Initially this was done by tying the regulatory ceilings on
deposit ratesto the yields on market instruments rather than by
completely abolishing them.
27. Complete deregulation of all time deposits with maturities
of more than 7 days occurred in October 1983.
28. Before 1978 the non-M2 component of M3 consisted
entirely of deregulated instruments, but the term component
included a mixture of regulated and deregulated assets.
29. That is, three dummy variables were included in the esti-
mated equations that took the value one in December 1982,
January 1983,and February 1983, respectively, and zero at all
other dates. Preliminary equations indicated that additional
dummy variables for laterdates were not statisticallysignificant,
implying that both the public and depository institutionsadjusted
rapidly to the authorization of the new instruments.
30. David F. Hendry, "Predictive Failure and Econometric
Modelling in Macroeconomics: The Transactions Demand for
Money" in P. Omerod (editor),EconomicModeling, London 1979.
The advantage of this specification isthat itdoes not require
the long sample period needed for the estimation of explicit
distributed lags, but it implies fewer restrictions on the response
of money demand to itsdeterminants than the partialadjustment
model. In particular, the error-correction model allows
changes in the macroeconomic variables to have a short-run
impact on money demand that may differ from their long-run
equilibrium effect.
31. Inthe MPS model ofthe U.S. economy,forexample,which is
estimated using quarterly data, the demand to hold the non-M1
component of M2 is assumed to be linearly homogeneous in
nominal wealth. In that model, changes in the stock of wealth
due to current savings and to changes in the value of equities
both are assumed to have short-run impacts on the proportion
of wealth held in the form of non-transactions M2. See Flint
Braytonand EileenMauskopf, 'The FederalReserveBoard MPS
Quarterly Econometric Model ofthe U.S. Economy," Economic
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Modelling, Volume 2, Number 3, July 1985.
32. Toprovide a rough test ofthe role of wealth inthe demand
for the aggregates, a monthly wealth series was constructed
from the quarterly data by interpolation. When this series was
added to the equations estimated inTables 2 and 3, neither the
level nor the growth rate of wealth was statistically c:innifir"",t
However, this lack of significance may have been due to the
crudeness of the measure of wealth used. Further research is
planned in this area.
33. In an attempt to deal with this problem, the preliminary
equations were estimated using both the average return and
the maximum return on the instruments in each aggregate as
measures of the own-rate. In addition, the equations were
estimated both using the own and market rates as separate
variables and using the spread between these rates as a sin-
gle variable. None of these various approaches yielded
satisfactory results.
34. Obviously the extent and speed of this response has
changed as deposit rate ceilings have been progressively
removed.
35. The same approach was used in Judd and Motley, "The
Great Velocity Decline.i ., op. cit.
36. As pointed out earlier, sincethe estimated equations include
no explicit wealth variable, changes inthe interest ratealso may
proxy for the effects on money demand of changes in the mar-
ket value of investors' portfolios of wealth.
37. An argument similar to the following one also has been
applied to the demand for Mi. See John P Judd and John L,
Scadding, "Liability Management, Bank Loans and Deposit
'Market' Disequilibrium," Economic Review, Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco, Summer 1981
38. For each aggregate, the change in bank loans isscaled by
the level of the aggregate in the preceding month, The varia-
ble included is of the form:
L':"LOANSt = (Bank Loans, - Bank
where M represents the appropriate monetary aggregate. This
scaling ofthe loans variable ensures that ithasthe same dimen-
sion as the dependent variable of Equation 3.
39. In particular, the adjustment to equilibrium would be
immediate if g were unity and hp' kq and ms all were zero,
40. Arnold Zellner, ':An efficientmethod of estimating seemingly
unrelated regressions and tests for aggregation bias," Journal
of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 57, June 1962.
41. In Tables 2 and 3,the long-run effect of the market interest
rate isrepresented by the coefficient on the lagged interest rate
level; this coefficient corresponds to the parameter c in Equa-
tion 3.The interest rate elasticity isthis coefficient multiplied by
the level of the interest rate. The average level of the commer-
cial paper rate was 6.2 percent in the first sample period and
10.3percent in the second period. The short-run impact of the
interest rate is given by the coefficients on the current and
lagged changes in the rate (L':"CPI).
42. In Tables 2 and 3, the long-run income elasticities are
represented by the coefficients on lagged income, These coeffi-
cients represent the parameter b in Equation 3, The short-runimpact is represented by the coefficients on the change in
income (.6.log Y). The coefficients on the change inincome were
small and statistically insignificant in the equations for both term
and non-M2 M3 in both sample periods. Hence, this variable
was excluded from the equations reported in the tables.
43. The F-statistics for the hypothesisthat the estimated coeffi-





The critical values for rejecting the hypothesis at the five per-
cent level of significance are 2.54 in the case of term M3 and
non-M2 M3 and 2.63 in the case of nonterm M3 and M2.
44. TheF-statistic for rejection the hypothesis ofconstant coeffi-
cients was larger in the case of term M3 and just significant at
the five percent level. See footnote 43.
45. This may be because for many investors the main substi-
tutes for nonterm assets are small-denomination time deposits.
When the yields on both nonterm assetsand smalltime deposits
were regulated, changes inmarket rateshad no impact on them
and thus did not cause much shifting of funds. Since deregula-
tion, variations in market rates cause larger and faster changes
in time deposit yields than in nonterm deposit rates, so making
the demand for nonterm assets more responsive to interest-
rate changes.
51